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Researchers and educators often argue that a student’s peers strongly inﬂuence his or her educa-
tional outcomes. If so, an unequal distribution of advantaged and disadvantaged students across schools
in a community will leave many students doubly disadvantaged and amplify existing inequalities. We
explore the relationship between the degree of sorting by socioeconomic characteristics, ethnicity and
language across schools within a community and inequality as measured by the variance of standard-
ized high school exam scores within the community. Simple cross-sectional estimates suggest a direct
relationship between sorting by ethnicity and the variance of test scores, but no direct relationship
between sorting by income or primary parent’s education and the variance of test scores. We then
implement a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator to control for endogeneity in the extent of sorting: the results
indicate that sorting by ethnicity does not aﬀect the variance of test scores, but that sorting by home
language and primary parent’s education does.
1 Introduction
Since the publication of James Coleman’s Equality of Educational Opportunity in 1966, social scientists
and policymakers have been concerned with the interaction of peer eﬀects and segregation or sorting
in maintaining or worsening economic inequality. A number of recent studies (Boozer and Cacciola
2001, Hanushek, Kain, Markman and Rivkin 2003, Hoxby 2000) provide evidence that student achieve-
ment as measured by performance on standardized tests is positively aﬀected by the achievement level
of classmates and/or schoolmates. If this is the case, then an unequal distribution of high-resource
(e.g., high income, high parental education, etc.) students across schools leaves most low-resource
students doubly disadvantaged: such students will have both lower private resource levels and a lower
quality peer group. As this diﬀerence in human capital leads to diﬀerences in income, initial dispar-
ities in resources may be maintained and even ampliﬁed over generations despite the best eﬀorts of
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1policymakers to provide equal opportunity (Durlauf 1996, Fernandez and Rogerson 1996). Although
empirical researchers have made some progress on establishing the existence and magnitude of school
peer eﬀects, much remains to be learned. The magnitude of the eﬀect of school sorting on inequality
in educational outcomes likewise is not yet well understood.
This paper uses data from the Canadian province of Alberta to evaluate the hypothesis that sort-
ing into schools exacerbates inequality in student outcomes. Our research design is similar in spirit
to Cutler and Glaeser’s (1997) and Card and Rothstein’s (2004) work on the consequences of racial
segregation in US cities. We use a simple regression framework to determine the empirical relation-
ship between community-level measures of segregation across schools by income, ethnicity, and other
characteristics and the community’s variance in standardized test scores at the Grade 9 level. By
using aggregate data, our approach avoids a number of the identiﬁcation problems that arise in using
individual-level data to estimate peer eﬀects (Manski 1993). In particular, our research design does
not require the assumption of random or exogenous selection into schools, nor does it require the ab-
sence of aggregate idiosyncratic factors. Furthermore, by focusing directly on the relationship between
sorting and inequality, we are able to directly quantify the potential for policy to reduce inequality by
reducing segregation.
Our research makes a number of unique and constructive contributions to the literature on peer
eﬀects, sorting and inequality. First, we explore sorting on a wider variety of dimensions than previous
studies, including ethnicity, family income, primary parent’s education, and the language spoken at
home. Second, we are able to link exam results in diﬀerent grades and years, and thus to construct
a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator that is robust when the degree of sorting within communities is endogenous.
This is important because if greater unobserved heterogeneity among students within a community
causes sorting, simple estimators based on aggregates in a cross-section of communities will be biased
in favour of ﬁnding a large eﬀect of sorting on inequality. Third, our data include students from both
public and private schools. Comparable data sets from the United States generally include students
from public schools only, which may introduce challenging selection issues.
Our cross-sectional results suggest that sorting by ethnicity increases the inequality (variance) of
test scores. Although the racial composition of our sample is very diﬀerent, this ﬁnding is similar
in nature to the results in Card and Rothstein (2004). We are further able to show that this result
persists even after controlling for sorting by several other household characteristics: wage and salary
income, transfer income (a proxy variable for low-income status), home language, and primary parent’s
education. Our cross-sectional estimates therefore suggest that it is sorting by ethnicity per se, rather
than one of these other variables, that leads to the increase in inequality. However, this pattern is
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sectional results are picking up the eﬀects of unobserved community heterogeneity that is correlated
with sorting by ethnicity. Instead, the ﬁxed eﬀects results suggest that sorting by parental education
and language spoken in the home increases the variance of test scores. The negative results we obtain
are also interesting. In particular, neither the cross-section nor ﬁxed eﬀects estimators produce any
evidence consistent with a peer eﬀect arising from either family wage and salary income or our proxy
measure for low-income status.
Finally, we use our estimates to explore the magnitudes of potential eﬀects from diﬀerent types of
desegregation policies. The results suggest that fully integrating the schools of the typical multiple
school community will have little eﬀect on inequality in that community, but integrating the schools
in some particularly segregated communities may have a large eﬀect.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is not directly a study of peer eﬀects, however, it shares with that literature both motivation
and many econometric issues. The key concern in most recent empirical work dealing with peer eﬀects
is to avoid the identiﬁcation problems noted by Manski (1993). Early research on peer eﬀects simply
included the average of either behavior or background characteristics among the survey respondent’s
peer group as a supposedly exogenous explanatory variable in a simple regression for the respondent’s
behavior. The coeﬃcient on the average peer variable would then be interpreted as a measure of the
peer eﬀect. Manski notes four major problems with this methodology. The ﬁrst problem (“sorting”) is
that self-selection into groups may lead to positive within-group correlation in many characteristics that
are relevant to the outcome, and some of these relevant characteristics may be unobserved. For example,
low-income students who attend private schools or public schools in high income neighborhoods may
have parents which particularly value education. The second problem (“common shocks”) is that
there may be unobserved aggregate inﬂuences on a particular group; for example one school may have
a particularly eﬀective or ineﬀective principal, which will tend to raise or lower all scores in a given
school. The third problem (“simultaneity”) is that the respondent inﬂuences his or her peers in the
same way the peers inﬂuence the respondent. Each of these three problems implies that average peer
behavior and/or characteristics will fail to be exogenous, and leads the reduced form coeﬃcient to be
an upwardly biased estimate of the true peer eﬀect. The fourth problem in this approach, also noted by
Manski, is that even in the absence of the ﬁrst three problems, there is no obvious way to distinguish
empirically between the inﬂuence of peer characteristics (“contextual peer eﬀects”) and the inﬂuence
of peer behavior (“endogenous peer eﬀects”) without imposing strong functional form assumptions on
3the econometric model.
Although a thorough survey of the empirical literature on peer eﬀects is beyond the scope of
this paper (see Moﬃtt 2001 for such a discussion), several recent studies have speciﬁcally aimed to
estimate the inﬂuence of peers on a student’s educational outcomes as measured by test scores, and
thus speak to some of the same questions as our work. These studies are characterized by the use
of experimental and other sources of credibly exogenous variation in peer group composition. Hoxby
(2000) uses idiosyncratic variation in gender and racial composition between diﬀerent cohorts at the
same school to identify peer eﬀects in test scores for Texas grade 3-6 students. Hanushek, et al. (2003)
use a matched panel of Texas grade 3-8 students and schools to estimate peer eﬀects while allowing
for student and school-grade ﬁxed eﬀects. Boozer and Cacciola (2001) exploit exogenous variation in
grades 1-3 classroom composition due to Tennessee’s “Project STAR” class size experiment. These
three studies ﬁnd nontrivial and statistically signiﬁcant peer eﬀects.
While informative about some issues related to peer eﬀects, sorting, and inequality, these microe-
conomic studies have two important limitations. First, those group characteristics for which there is
exogenous variation are not necessarily those that are targeted by a given policy. A number of costly
policies to reduce sorting, for example the Moving To Opportunity program (Katz, Kling and Liebman
2001), are aimed speciﬁcally at reducing sorting by income. However, none of the studies referenced
above speaks directly to the eﬀect of peer family income on academic outcomes, simply because their
data lack credibly exogenous sources of variation in peer family income.
The second limitation of this literature is that estimates of peer eﬀects by themselves tell us little
about the relationship between sorting and inequality. If there are school-level peer eﬀects, there
will be a positive relationship between at least some types of sorting across schools and inequality in
student outcomes. However, without further quantitative analysis it is diﬃcult to say whether sorting
explains a large or small proportion of the variation in test scores across students. This depends not
only on the magnitude of peer eﬀects, but on both the degree of sorting actually observed and whether
the characteristics that are sorted on are the characteristics that are associated with substantial peer
eﬀects. Because inequality is generated by the interaction of sorting and peer eﬀects, it is possible that
what might be described as substantial sorting and substantial peer eﬀects do not actually generate
substantial inequality in combination. For example, Kremer (1997) develops a calibration methodology
to estimate the long-run impact on inequality of what had been previously described as a large increase
in marital and residential sorting. Despite calibrating the model with relatively large social interaction
eﬀects, Kremer ﬁnds that the long run impact of the increased sorting on inequality is minimal. This
ﬁnding suggests that there is a clear need for direct quantitative evidence on the relationship between
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Our research uses cross-community data on sorting of students into schools based on their family
characteristics to ﬁll this gap in the literature. It is most closely related to the work by Cutler and
Glaeser (1997) and Card and Rothstein (2004) on the eﬀects of racial segregation in US cities. Cutler
and Glaeser characterize segregation by a dissimilarity index calculated across the census tracts in a
city, and include both this measure of segregation and an interaction term for segregation and race
in regressions for various individual outcomes. Card and Rothstein characterize segregation by the
black-white gap in percentage of black schoolmates, and include this measure of segregation along
with measures of black-white gaps in various socioeconomic characteristics in a regression for the
black-white SAT score gap in the city. Our work uses a similar research design to these studies, while
considering sorting on a wider variety of characteristics.
The essential feature of the cross-community (or cross-city) approach is that it does not require
the assumption that families do not sort; indeed it exploits the fact that they do. This feature enables
us to estimate the impact of sorting along a much wider and potentially more policy-relevant set of
dimensions, including income, parental education, and other characteristics. A second beneﬁt of the
cross-community approach is that it will capture eﬀects of sorting on inequality that arise through
mechanisms other than peer eﬀects. For example, suppose that political processes operate to move
resources from poor schools to rich schools. In that case, a community in which schools are more
strongly sorted on income may have a more unequal distribution of resources across schools, and thus
a greater dispersion in student outcomes, even in the absence of peer eﬀects. In some sense, this
“contaminates” our results if the primary goal is to estimate peer eﬀects; however, it is an advantage
if the goal is to estimate the eﬀect of sorting on inequality.
2 Theory and Methodology
The overall methodology in the paper involves estimating the parameters of a simple linear regression
model using community-level data. The dependent variable is the variance in exam scores across
the students in the community, and the explanatory variables include measures of the variance in
background characteristics of the students’ families, as well as measures of the degree of sorting across
the community’s schools with respect to these same characteristics. This basic regression is estimated
using both a cross-sectional and ﬁxed eﬀects approach, and the estimated coeﬃcients on the sorting
variables are interpreted as providing information on the eﬀect of sorting on inequality.
To motivate this approach, and discuss some of the econometric and conceptual issues, this section
5introduces a simple model of peer eﬀects and sorting. Because we are working with aggregate variables
at two diﬀerent levels of aggregation (school and community) and potentially at diﬀerent points in
time, the notation is somewhat complex. Time is indexed by t, and communities are indexed by c.
The number of schools in community c in period t is given by Sct, and schools within that community
are indexed by s = 1,2,,Sct.
Let xisct be an arbitrary individual-level variable describing individual at school i in school s of
community c in period t. Let Nsct be the number of students taking the exam in school s, and
let Nct =
PSct
s=1 Nsct be the total number of students taking the exam in community c. The school
average of x is given by ¯ xsct = 1
Nsct
PNsct
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The cross-school variance is our measure of sorting, and is the natural measure of sorting under the
model described in the next section. Under perfect integration (all of the schools in community c
have the same value of ¯ xsct), it will be the case that CSVct(x) = 0. Under perfect segregation (each
school in community c is perfectly homogeneous) it will be the case that CSVct(x) = σ2
sct(x). The
number of schools in a community may actually constrain the range of possible sorting: for example,
communities with only one school will always have CSVct(x) = 0 by construction. Because there may
be a statistical relationship between the size of a community and its level of unobserved heterogeneity,
we always include the number of schools in a community as an explanatory variable to avoid mistakenly
interpreting size eﬀects as sorting eﬀects. Note that the degree of sorting in a community as measured
by the cross school variance depends on the relevant variable; for example a community may be heavily
sorted on ethnicity but not on income.
62.1 A simple model of peer eﬀects
Next we outline a simple linear model of peer eﬀects in academic performance. Let yisct be the exam
score of an individual i attending school s in community c at time t, and suppose that:
yisct = zisct + γ¯ ysct + λ¯ zsct (4)
where zisct is the student’s (unobserved) ability, ¯ ysct is the average score in the student’s school, and
¯ zsct is the (unobserved) average ability among the student’s peers. “Ability” is meant here as simply
a catch-all term for any private input into student performance: it could include innate talent, prior
educational experience, parental inputs, and anything other than the qualities and/or performance of
the current peer group. The model above includes both endogenous peer eﬀects (that operate through
¯ ysct) and contextual eﬀects (that operate through ¯ zsct). The endogenous peer eﬀect is assumed to
satisfy the stability condition γ < 1; otherwise the average score implied by the model is not necessarily
ﬁnite. There are a number of diﬀerent mechanisms that could generate peer eﬀects, including:
• Simple externalities/spillovers: students may learn from one another and thus learn more when
in contact with high-achieving or high-ability peers.
• Provision of public goods: parents with high endowments of time, money, or skills may supply
public goods to their child’s classrooms.
• Scarcity of instructor’s time: students with behavioral or learning problems may take instruction
time or energy away from classmates.
• Political economy/resource considerations: parents with high interest or resource levels may
divert resources towards their child’s school.
• Specialization: homogeneous classes may facilitate eﬃciency through specialization or reduced
discrimination.
As with most of the literature, we will not be able to distinguish between these diﬀerent mechanisms,
nor between endogenous and contextual eﬀects. This model is a standard one in the literature on peer
eﬀects, and researchers have made numerous attempts to estimate this type of model using various
proxy variables for student ability. However, as discussed previously, the model parameters are not
identiﬁed from standard microeconomic data when schools are sorted on ability (Manski 1993), because
this sorting induces positive correlation between the unobserved components of the student’s ability
(zisct) and the observed performance or characteristics of the student’s peers (¯ ysct or ¯ zsct ). Rather
than use microeconomic data to estimate peer eﬀects we use aggregate data to directly estimate the
7eﬀect of sorting on inequality.
To do this, we aggregate the model, and decompose the community-level variance in test scores
into a portion that is due to community-level variance in inputs, and a portion that is due to sorting.
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Equation (9) shows how the community-level variance in student outcomes (test scores) can be broken
down into a portion that is explained by community level variance in inputs, and a portion that is
explained by sorting. As equation (9) indicates, sorting will aﬀect the overall variance in outcomes in
the presence of peer eﬀects, i.e., when either γ or λ is positive. In the absence of peer eﬀects, only the
variation in inputs across individuals matters for the variation in test scores.
2.2 Econometric Implementation
Because the model presented above is highly stylized and revolves around an unobserved input, equa-
tion (9) is not estimated directly but rather used to motivate a simple econometric exercise. We assume
8that for a vector of observable community-level variables Xct and vector of unknown parameters α
that
σ2
ct(z) = Xctα + uct (10)
and that for a diﬀerent vector of observable community-level variables Wct and vector of unknown
parameters δ:
CSVct(z) = Wctδ + vct (11)
In the application, the X variables primarily include measures of the variability in inputs across families
in the community, in particular the variance in wage and salary income, primary parent’s education,
etc. It will also include a few variables that may be associated with the variance in unobserved inputs,
in particular the number of schools in the community and the average number of students writing
the exam. The W variables include measures of the variability across schools in the community, in
particular the cross-school variance in wage and salary income, primary parent’s education, etc.
Combining equations (9), (10), and (11), we get the reduced form:
σ2
ct(y) = Xctα + Wctδ
λ2 + 2λ + 2γ − γ2
(1 − γ)2 + uct + vct
λ2 + 2λ + 2γ − γ2
(1 − γ)2 (12)
= Xctα + Wctβ + ct
Interpretation of the reduced form coeﬃcients is straightforward: the marginal impact of sorting on
inequality is given by β. When there is no peer eﬀect (γ = λ = 0), the true value of the reduced
form coeﬃcient is β = 0. As in much of the literature we will not be able to separately identify
endogenous eﬀects (γ) and contextual eﬀects (λ). However, our approach can identify β without
assuming exogenous selection into schools.
We pursue two strategies for estimating the coeﬃcients in (12). The baseline regression uses OLS
on the cross-sectional Grade 9 data, and will generate consistent estimates of β if:
E(ct|Xt,Wt) = 0 (13)
In order for this assumption to be satisﬁed, we need two sets of conditions to hold. First, either sorting
on unobserved dimensions is unrelated to sorting on observed dimensions
E(vct|Xt,Wt) = 0 (14)
9or there is no peer eﬀect
γ = λ = 0 (15)
However, because we are not interested in interpreting our estimates in a narrow structural sense, we
are not overly concerned if there is correlation between observed and unobserved sorting in the absence
of peer eﬀects. Assumption (14) therefore is relatively innocuous for our purposes.
Second, we will need the unobserved variation in heterogeneity across communities to be unrelated
to both observed heterogeneity and the degree of sorting:
E(uct|Xct,Wct) = 0 (16)
Again, because we are not going to push a strict structural interpretation of our coeﬃcients, we are
not concerned about the ﬁrst of these assumptions. The second assumption is a more serious concern,
since it is not diﬃcult to imagine greater unobserved heterogeneity within a community leading aﬄuent
families to take greater steps to segregate from disadvantaged families. We are interested in identifying
heterogeneity that is caused by sorting, rather than the reverse. In order to do so, we use our linked
Grade 9/Grade 6 data to develop a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. In this case, we allow unobserved community
and/or cohort speciﬁc factors which aﬀect the variance in outcomes and are correlated with observables.
Speciﬁcally, we replace (13) with the much weaker assumption:
E(∆ct|∆Xct,∆Wct) = 0 (17)
and estimate the regression
∆σ2
ct(y) = ∆Xctα + ∆Wctβ + ∆ct (18)
The speciﬁcation (18) allows for there to be a community-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect which aﬀects the variance
in test scores and is correlated with the degree of sorting.
3 Data
3.1 An overview of Alberta’s Provincial examination program
Alberta is a large province in western Canada with an economy based on agriculture and natural
resource extraction. The population is concentrated in two large metropolitan areas (Calgary and
Edmonton), several smaller cities and a large number of small agricultural or resource industry towns.
10Approximately 547,000 students attended Alberta’s kindergarten to Grade 12 public school system
in the 2000-2001 school year (Interprovincial Education Statistics Project 2002). Although it is ad-
ministered mostly by local school boards, education is funded by the province and therefore per pupil
funding formulas are the same in all public schools. Although a number of students attend private
schools, both the size and degree of independence of the private educational sector are less than in
the United States. In particular, 92 percent of the 192 private schools in 2001 were classiﬁed as
“accredited” and therefore received provincial funding and were subject to provincial standards and
curriculum requirements. The remaining private schools were classiﬁed as “registered” and did not
receive provincial funding. Alberta reports that 4% of its students attended private schools in 2001,
and such schools received per-student funding at approximately 60% of the per-student public school
funding (Alberta Learning 2002a, Sections 8.2 and 8.4).
The Achievement Tests are conducted in Grades 3, 6, and 9. The exams are in the core academic
subjects of Language Arts, Mathematics, Science, and Social Studies, and are intended to be taken by
all students. Both accredited and registered private schools participate in these exams, as do public
schools. Our research explores the eﬀects of sorting on the community-level variance of Grade 9 test
scores in Language Arts and Mathematics. We also use linked Grade 6 and Grade 9 data to construct
a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator of our model. Because the exams are in principle mandatory, and because
there are almost no dropouts at this level, the selection issues involved in this estimation are relatively
minor. However, a small fraction of students do not take the exams. Approximately 4% to 7% of Grade
9 students are absent from school on the exam day and fail to take a make-up exam. In addition, a
student may be excused from the exam if his or her principal judges that he or she is “incapable of
responding to the exam,” or if “participation will be harmful to the student.” Approximately 3% to
6% of students are exempted in this manner (Alberta Learning 2002b).
3.2 Data structure and links with data on family characteristics
The data set was originally assembled by Cowley and Easton (2002) in conjunction with Statistics
Canada and the Alberta provincial government. The primary unit of observation in the Cowley and
Easton data set is the school. For each exam and each school, the data set provides the mean and
variance of exam scores for the school, as well as the average number of students taking the exam and
other school-level variables. If ﬁve or fewer students at a given school take a given exam in a given
year, results are suppressed.
In addition, the Cowley and Easton data set features detailed Census data on the family char-
acteristics of the school population. Statistics Canada has provided a custom 1996 Census data set
11describing the population of households with one or more children of secondary school age, organized
by Enumeration Area (EA). This data set includes means and variances of a wide variety of back-
ground characteristics, including family income from various sources, ethnicity, language spoken at
home, and primary parent’s education. The Alberta provincial government has provided a breakdown
of each school’s population of enrolled students by EA of residence. The Census EA-level data are
then aggregated to the school level using weights based on the number of students in each EA. The
resulting data set thus approximates the characteristics of the families who have children attending
each school.
3.3 Aggregation to community level
Although the Cowley and Easton data set is at the school level, the relevant unit of observation in this
study is the group of schools in a community. For the purposes of this study, a community is deﬁned
as a collection of one or more municipalities that form an integrated labor market and host at least
one school oﬀering Grade 9. Two municipalities are considered to be part of the same community
if they are fewer than 30 minutes driving time apart and at least one municipality has a population
over 10,000. This deﬁnition implies that, for example, the major city Calgary and its suburbs are
treated as part of the same community, but two farming towns nearby to one another are treated as
two distinct communities. We distinguish between small and large municipalities in this way because
many of Alberta’s small municipalities are agricultural centres, where people’s residential choices are
dictated by the location of farmland, rather than residential amenities such as schools. Driving distance
is calculated by using the quickest route provided by Microsoft’s Expedia (http://www.expedia.ca)
web site. Once communities are deﬁned, the original school level data are aggregated to the community
level using weights based on the number of students taking the exam in each school.
This method for deﬁning communities generates 205 distinct communities in Alberta that had at
least one school oﬀering Grade 9 in 2001. For each community, the 2001 Grade 9 data is also linked to
the community’s Grade 6 results from the year (1998) when most of the 2001 Grade 9 class would have
been in Grade 6. The assignment of Grade 6 schools to Grade 9 communities is slightly complicated
by some cases where a very small municipality has a local elementary school but sends its students to
a high school in another municipality. For example, Grade 6 students attending Dunstable School in
the town of Busby generally attend Barrhead Composite in Barrhead for Grade 9, and so are assigned
in our data to the community of Barrhead. For each such Grade 6 school, we contacted the school
directly to identify the high school 1998 Grade 6 students were expected to attend in 2001.
124 Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 describes the number of schools at each grade level in the 205 communities in our sample. The
majority of these communities are small, where all of the Grade 6 students attend a single elementary or
middle school and all of the Grade 9 students attend a single junior high or high school. A substantial
number of communities have two schools at one or both grade levels. The two large metropolitan areas
of Calgary and Edmonton have over 200 schools oﬀering Grade 6 and over 100 schools oﬀering Grade
9.
Table 2 characterizes the sample in terms of the diﬀerence between the number of Grade 6 and Grade
9 schools within communities. In Alberta, Grade 6 students generally attend an elementary (Grade 1-7
or 1-6) school, while Grade 9 students attend high schools (Grade 8-12) or junior high schools (Grade
7-9). Elementary schools are generally smaller than high schools so multiple elementary schools will
often “feed” a given high school. This reallocation can in principle generate large changes in sorting.
The number of Grade 6 schools in the community is equal to the number of Grade 9 schools in 155
of these communities, and the number of Grade 6 schools is higher in 47 communities. In 21 of these
47 communities, students attending two or more schools for Grade 6 are merged into a single Grade 9
school. Three communities had more schools oﬀering Grade 9 than schools oﬀering Grade 6 in three
communities, a pattern that can be explained by the greater availability of private school alternatives
to the public school system at the Grade 9 level.
Community-level summary statistics for both exam scores and family characteristics are reported
for the 205 communities in the sample in Tables 3 and 4.1 Table 3 shows that the communities in our
sample exhibit substantial variation in the average exam performance of their students. The average
community-level mean score on the Language Arts exam was 68.5, and ranged from 40.6 to 79.5. The
average community-level mean score on the Math exam was 29.8, and ranged from 10.9 to 39.3. Table
3 also shows that some communities have considerably greater heterogeneity in Grade 9 test scores
than others. The community-level variance of the Language Arts scores ranges from 35.5 in the most
homogeneous (with respect to Language Arts test scores) community in the sample to 563.1 in the most
heterogeneous. The community-level variance of the Math scores ranges from 9.4 to 184.9. In both
cases, the cross-school variation in test scores is a small proportion of the overall within-community
variation in test scores. Although there is variation in student performance across schools within most
1Note that the mean of community-level means is distinct from the provincial mean for a variable because it weighs small
and large communities equally.
13communities, there is much more variation within schools.
Our model includes as explanatory variables the community-level variances and cross-school vari-
ances of two groups of variables derived from the Canadian Census, as well as measures of the average
number of students writing the exam in each school and the number of schools. The ﬁrst group of
Census variables describes ethnicity and language spoken at home, and the second group includes
measures of socioeconomic status, including income. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for these
variables.
The question of whether sorting by race and ethnicity aﬀects inequality has been of particular
interest in the US literature, and so our regression analysis begins by exploring whether sorting by
race and ethnicity aﬀects inequality in the Alberta context. Clearly, the ethnic composition of our
sample of families with school-age children in Alberta is very diﬀerent from the composition of samples
used in the related US literature, and the historical context in Canada is diﬀerent in several important
respects. The largest minority group in Alberta, who self-report as Aboriginal, make up seven percent
of our sample. The self-reported ethnicity of a further three percent of the sample places them in the
category of “Visible Minority”. For Census purposes, those who self-identify as Aboriginal are not
counted as visible minorities.
The historic relationship between aboriginal people in Canada and the school system has frequently
been unhappy, and unsuccessful. The challenges that aboriginal students in Canada face in the public
school system are well-known, and are the focus of much concern among community leaders and policy-
makers.2 Understanding the eﬀect of sorting by aboriginal status on inequality of educational outcomes
therefore is of direct policy interest. Although only 7 percent of the overall sample is Aboriginal, many
small communities include substantial numbers of aboriginal people: the proportion of families with
school age children that are headed by self-reported aboriginal people in communities in our sample
ranges from 0 to 98 percent.
Visible minority status may be correlated with cultural factors that aﬀect learning outcomes, or
may subject students to discrimination or cultural stereotyping that aﬀects their school performance.
Although they make up only three percent of heads of families with school-age children in our sample,
visible minorities are also concentrated in particular communities: the proportion of visible minority
families in our communities ranges from zero to over 44 percent. Over one-third of those with visible
minority status in our sample report their ethnicity as Chinese. Other ethnic groups do not make up a
signiﬁcant proportion of the overall school-age population in Alberta, but because of their concentration
2See for example, BC Ministry of Education (2002) and discussion on the Ministry’s website at
http://www.bced.gov.bc.ca/abed/abed.
14in a small number of communities, do make up a signiﬁcant proportion of the school-age population
in those communities. People of Japanese ancestry, for example, form only .23 percent of the overall
number of heads of families with school-age population, but make up over 31 percent of this group
in the community of Banﬀ, where the economy relies heavily on Japanese tourism. Other groups
that make up substantial portions of the school-age family heads in one or more Alberta communities
include Filipinos, Arabs/West Asians and Latin Americans.
Unlike the literature on black-white diﬀerentials in the US, interpreting the eﬀect of ethnicity in
our study is complicated by the fact that minority families are more likely than non-minority families
to speak the language of instruction as a second language.3 We therefore include variance measures
based on the proportion of students who do not hear either English or French spoken at home on a
regular basis. Overall, three percent of students in our sample live in such homes: the proportion of
homes with school-age children where neither oﬃcial language is spoken ranges from 0 to 64 percent
across communities.
We focus on three indicators of socioeconomic status: family wage and salary income, family
government transfer income, and the level of education of the primary parent. Income may aﬀect
learning directly if parents with greater ﬁnancial means are able to provide more resources in support
of their child’s learning, such as tutoring services. More generally, income may aﬀect health and self-
esteem, which in turn inﬂuence both learning and behavior. However, it is not obvious that we would
expect the relationship between family income and student learning to conform to the linear functional
form that underlies our empirical speciﬁcation. As a result, we also include the level of government
transfer income as a proxy for low-income status. Because there is no signiﬁcant intra-provincial
variation in transfer programs, the level of transfer income will be closely and positively related to
low-income status.4 Our second indicator of socioeconomic status, primary parent’s education, has
been shown elsewhere to be an important predictor of individual student academic performance (see,
for example, Hanushek and Raymond 2004). The average community in the sample has a mean family
income of just over $40,000 per year, mean transfer income of about $4,000 per year, and a mean
level of primary parent’s education of almost one year of post-secondary schooling. All three of these
variables exhibit substantial variation across communities, as do their variances.
Finally, we include in our model both the number of schools in the community and the average
3Canada is an oﬃcially bilingual country, where French and English have the same legal status. Although Alberta has a
very small francophone population, federal funds are available to support programs and schools where French is the language
of instruction.
4Government transfer income includes all transfer payments received from federal, provincial or municipal governments.
This variable is the sum of the amounts reported as Old Age Security and Guaranteed Income Supplements, Canada Pension
Plan, Employment Insurance, Canada Child Tax beneﬁts, and “other income from government sources.”
15number of students writing the exam in each school. Including the number of schools in the community
is a way to control for the potential for group heterogeneity associated with such factors as variation
in teacher and principal quality across schools. School size may aﬀect the variance of outcomes both
because school-level averages will tend to be more variable when the schools are small, simply because
the averages are taken over fewer observations (Graham 2004), and because school size itself has been
shown to aﬀect student performance (Bedard, Jr. and Helland 2001, e.g.).
4.2 Cross-Section Regression Results
The ﬁrst set of results, presented in Table 5, shows estimates from a variety of speciﬁcations of the
cross-sectional model (12) for the community-level variance in both the Language Arts and Math
exams. All speciﬁcations include a basic set of variables that includes the average number of students
writing the exam in each school, a quadratic term in the number of schools in the community, and
the community-level variances of the six household characteristics of interest: visible minority status,
aboriginal status, home language, wage and salary income, government transfer income, and education
of the primary parent.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes only these variables and no sorting variables. The results, presented
in the ﬁrst columns of each of the Language Arts and Math panels, show that the variances of both
the Math and Language Arts test scores are increasing in the average number of students writing the
exams in each school, and are increasing at a decreasing rate in the number of schools. This evidence
with respect to group heterogeneity suggests that school level inputs such as teacher quality may play
a signiﬁcant role in determining test score results in the case of Math, but not in the case of Language
Arts. The point estimates of the eﬀect on the variance of test scores of the variance of visible minority
status and education are positive for both Math and Language Arts, as one might expect, but the
other variance terms are sometimes or always negative. Most of these coeﬃcients are statistically
insigniﬁcant.
The remainder of Table 5 presents results of various speciﬁcations that include sorting by ethnicity
and language. Because the sorting variables are highly collinear, we estimate speciﬁcations including
each sorting variable separately, as well as a speciﬁcation including all three together. When we add
the sorting variables one at a time we ﬁnd that sorting by visible minority status and by home language
has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant association with the community-level variances of both the
Math and Language Arts results. Sorting by aboriginal status also has a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant association with the Math results, but is insigniﬁcant in the Language Arts results. When
these three sorting variables are included together, sorting by visible minority status knocks out any
16independent eﬀect of sorting by home language in both cases.
Table 6 presents speciﬁcations that include variables describing sorting on socioeconomic charac-
teristics. We ﬁnd that sorting by wage and salary income and by educational status is not statistically
signiﬁcant in either Math or Language Arts, but that sorting by transfer income is. The statistical
signiﬁcance of sorting by transfer income remains when all three socioeconomic variables are included
in the model.
When all six sorting variables are included in the model, shown in Table 7, only sorting by visible
minority status remains statistically signiﬁcant in both exams, and sorting by aboriginal status remains
statistically signiﬁcant in the Math results. The statistical signiﬁcance of sorting by government
transfer income disappears when sorting by aboriginal status is included in the model. Overall, these
results give the impression that there is some sort of peer eﬀect associated with minority status that
is distinct from an eﬀect of income or primary parent’s education. Surprisingly, income and primary
parent’s education do not appear to be associated with a peer or sorting eﬀect at all.
The spillover eﬀects associated with the sorting variables in these regressions are identiﬁed from
cross-community variation in sorting, and can be given causal interpretation only if sorting is not cor-
related with unobserved community-level eﬀects that play a role in determining the overall variance of
test scores. It is easy to imagine that the sorting process may be endogenous, whereby greater unob-
served heterogeneity within a community’s population may cause both increased sorting and increased
variance in test scores. This type of endogenous sorting mechanism would lead us to overestimate the
eﬀect of sorting if not accounted for. The pattern of results in Tables 5 through 7, for example, is
consistent with a world in which a greater degree of unobserved diversity within the community in
characteristics that aﬀect test scores leads to increased sorting by visible minority status, aboriginal
status, and home language, but little or even reduced sorting directly by income and education. We
therefore pursue an alternative identiﬁcation strategy that exploits a more credibly exogenous source
of variation in the degree of sorting within communities.
4.3 First-Diﬀerence Regression Results
As described earlier, we have linked the 2001 Grade 9 test results to the 1998 Grade 6 test results from
the same communities. We are then able to create ﬁrst diﬀerence measures of the community-level
variance in test scores, the community-level variance in characteristics, and the cross-school variance in
characteristics. This ﬁrst diﬀerencing procedure has the eﬀect of eliminating any community-speciﬁc
factors which aﬀect the variance of exam scores across students and which might be correlated with
the observed degree of sorting.
17Table 2 showed that in 155 of the 205 communities in the sample, the number of Grade 6 schools
and the number of Grade 9 schools is the same. In these communities, ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the sorting
variables will generate variation only from migration into and out of the communities that alters the
geographical distribution of characteristics. In the remaining 50 communities, the change in the cross-
school variance of the sorting variables will come primarily from diﬀerences between the elementary and
high school catchment boundaries. On average for this group of communities, the value of measured
sorting by all six characteristics considered is smaller at the Grade 9 level than at the Grade 6 level,
and the change is orders of magnitude greater compared to communities where the numbers of schools
is the same at both grade levels.
Because ﬁrst diﬀerencing substantially reduces variation in some of the explanatory variables, the
speciﬁcation of the ﬁxed eﬀects model is simpliﬁed somewhat. Both the Grade 6 and Grade 9 family
characteristic measures are derived from the same 1996 Census data, so that any changes in the
community level variance of the background variables will only be due to changes in the distribution of
students across Census EA’s. As a result, this variation will be noisy and close to zero. We therefore
do not include changes in the variances of characteristics in our ﬁrst diﬀerence speciﬁcations. In
contrast, variation in the cross-school variance will be generated in part by changes in school catchment
boundaries.
Tables 8 and 9 show that when the sorting variables are included one at a time, primary parent’s
education is statistically signiﬁcant in the regressions for both exams, and home language is statistically
signiﬁcant in the Language Arts case. Table 10 shows that the same results obtain when all sorting
variables are included in the model. None of the other sorting variables is statistically signiﬁcant.
It is interesting to compare these results to the cross-section estimates. Some results are quali-
tatively similar: wage and salary income is not statistically signiﬁcant in either the ﬁxed eﬀects or
cross-section results for either the Language Arts or Math exams, and aboriginal status is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant in either the ﬁxed eﬀects or cross-section results for Language Arts. Of the results
that do diﬀer, their diﬀerences may reﬂect several factors: point estimates may diﬀer because social
interactions have a diﬀerent eﬀect at diﬀerent grade levels or because of the treatment of unobserved
heterogeneity; statistical signiﬁcance may diﬀer because variables exhibit greater independent varia-
tion in the cross-section or the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced data. Although we can’t sort out these possibilities
deﬁnitively, we oﬀer our preferred interpretation of each result. We ﬁnd that visible minority status
and transfer income are statistically signiﬁcant for both exams in the cross-section results, but not for
either in the ﬁxed eﬀects results. We think it is more likely that sorting by visible minority status and
low income is correlated with unobserved heterogeneity across communities in the variance of unob-
18served factors that aﬀect test scores than that their role in the production function of the variance of
test scores is diﬀerent at the diﬀerent grade levels. We think the reverse is likely to be true for primary
parent’s education, which is statistically signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for both exams but
not in the cross-section estimates for either. It seems plausible that communities would be more likely
to sort themselves by visible minority and low income status than by primary parent’s education, since
the former characteristics are more easily observed. The strength of the eﬀect of sorting by home
language in the ﬁxed eﬀects Language Arts results may reﬂect either the increased importance of this
variable at higher grade levels, or greater independent variation in sorting by home language in the
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced data.
4.4 How Big Are the Estimated Sorting Eﬀects?
We next assess the magnitudes of eﬀects of sorting according to characteristics that appear to matter,
using the estimates from models that include a single sorting variable. Table 11 presents the predicted
change in the variance of test scores (based on the cross-section results) that would result from complete
desegregation of multi-school communities along a single dimension. For example, the cross-section
estimates generate the prediction that fully integrating visible minority students in the average (with
respect to sorting by visible minority status) multi-school community would reduce the average variance
of Language Arts test scores by 4.5 percent, and would reduce the average variance of Math test
scores by 2.5 percent. Fully integrating aboriginal students in the average (with respect to sorting
by aboriginal status) multi-school community is predicted to reduce the average variance of Language
Arts test scores by .4 percent and Math test scores by 1.7 percent. Integrating by home language in
the average (with respect to sorting by home language) multi-school community is predicted to reduce
the average variance of Language Arts scores by 3.3 percent and Math scores by 4.3 percent. Finally,
integrating by government transfer income the average (with respect to sorting by transfer income)
multi-school community is predicted to reduce the average variance of Language Arts test scores by
2.5 percent and Math test scores by 3.3 percent.
Table 12 presents predictions based on the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for the variables that were im-
portant in these results. Eliminating segregation by home language in Grade 9 schools in the average
(with respect to home language) multi-school community is predicted to reduce the average variance
of Grade 9 Language Arts test scores by 2.6 percent and the average variance of Grade 9 Math scores
by .3 percent. Eliminating segregation by parental education in Grade 9 schools in the average (with
respect to primary parent’s education) multi-school community is predicted to reduce the average vari-
ance of Grade 9 Language Arts test scores by 1.2 percent and the variance of the Grade 9 Math test
19scores by 2.7 percent.
These estimates refer to the predicted eﬀect of desegregating communities with average degrees
of sorting. How big an eﬀect would we expect if we integrated the most segregated communities?
Alberta’s capital city, Edmonton, is the most highly segregated community in our sample in terms of
both home language and education. While the average level of education in Edmonton is very close
to the sample mean, the proportion of students who live in homes where neither French nor English
are usually spoken is almost 12 percent, compared to 3.5 percent in the average community in the
sample. According to the ﬁrst diﬀerence estimates, fully integrating the Grade 9 schools in Edmonton
according to home language would reduce the variance of Grade 9 Language Arts test scores by 41
percent, and Grade 9 Math scores by 4.8 percent. Fully integrating the Grade 9 schools in Edmonton
according to primary parent’s education would reduce the variance of Grade 9 Language Arts test
scores by 11.1 percent, and of Grade 9 Math test scores by 39.1 percent.
5 Conclusion
The results reported in this paper suggest that certain types of sorting across schools increase the
community-level variance of test scores on standardized exams in Alberta high schools. This evidence
contributes to the literature on peer eﬀects, sorting and inequality in two ways. First, it provides new
evidence that sorting across school aﬀects students’ exam performance. Unlike previous studies of peer
eﬀects in schools, we are able to explore the possibility that the family income and parents’ education
of a student’s peers may aﬀect his or her learning, and to consider the eﬀect of the language spoken
in peers’ homes as well as the ethnic and cultural composition of the peer group. Second, it allows us
to gauge the magnitude of the eﬀect of sorting on inequality of student outcomes, and conversely to
quantify the potential for programs designed to integrate school communities according to a number
of important characteristics, such as ethnicity and income, to reduce current levels of inequality in
student outcomes.
Our cross-sectional estimates indicate a sorting eﬀect that might be associated directly with ethnic-
ity, rather than other characteristics that are correlated with ethnicity, including family wage and salary
income, government transfer income, primary parent’s education and language spoken in the home.
This intriguing result suggests that factors such as diﬀerences in cultural norms or discrimination may
be generating peer eﬀects within school communities. Endogenous sorting may be contaminating these
results if, as seems plausible, communities that are more diverse in unobserved ways are more likely to
sort themselves along ethnic or racial lines. When we implement a procedure that diﬀerences out any
20relevant unobserved heterogeneity within communities, we ﬁnd that sorting by visible minority status
and aboriginal status is no longer statistically signiﬁcant in the results for either exam. While it may
be the case that ethnicity matters for learning up until Grade 6 but not beyond, we think it more likely
that the cross-sectional results are picking up the eﬀects of unobserved community heterogeneity that
is correlated with sorting by ethnicity.
The ﬁxed eﬀects estimates do generate results consistent with social interactions, although they
are not associated with ethnicity itself. Communities in which the degree of sorting by home language
falls more as students move from elementary to high school exhibit a greater reduction in inequality
in Language Arts test scores between Grades 6 and 9, and communities in which the degree of sorting
by primary parent’s education falls more exhibit a greater reduction in inequality in both Language
Arts and Math test scores. These results seem intuitively plausible. Parental education may serve as a
proxy for other characteristics that might aﬀect peers, such as the degree of parental provision of public
goods or political economy considerations, or it may be correlated with ability and therefore picking
up simple externalities. Language spoken in the home may also serve as a proxy for public goods or
political economy considerations. Furthermore, students from homes where English is not spoken may
themselves have relatively weak English language skills. The presence of students in the classroom
with weak language skills may alter teaching methods in ways that aﬀect their fellow students’ progress
in the Language Arts.
The negative results we obtain are also interesting. In particular, neither the cross-section nor ﬁxed
eﬀects estimates produce any evidence consistent with any social interaction eﬀect arising directly from
family wage and salary income or a proxy measure for low-income status.
A number of these sorting variables are fairly highly correlated with one another, so that policies
that target desegregation according to characteristics that do not appear to be directly associated
with social interactions may nevertheless reduce the inequality of test scores. The cross-section es-
timates indicate that integrating by ethnicity, home language or transfer income would reduce test
score inequality. This last result suggests that programs that target low income families of the type
implemented in the Moving to Opportunity project could be eﬀective in the Alberta context. However,
the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates undermine this ﬁnding, suggesting that the apparent role of ethnicity and
low income may merely be picking up the eﬀects of endogenous sorting. The ﬁxed eﬀects estimates
suggest that desegregating communities according to language spoken in the home is most likely to
eﬀect a signiﬁcant reduction in Language Arts test score inequality, and desegregating communities
according to primary parent’s education is most likely to eﬀect a signiﬁcant reduction in Math test
score inequality.
21The point estimates suggest that within the average community studied, the magnitudes of the
eﬀects of sorting on the variance of test scores are not especially large. In the small number of larger
cities in the sample with their more diverse populations, however, the estimated magnitudes are very
large. The signiﬁcance of these results from a policy perspective would be clearer if we were able to
say more about the eﬀect of sorting on other moments of the test score distributions. In particular, it
would be helpful to know whether sorting has a symmetric eﬀect on the upper and lower tails of the
distributions. While the data set used in this study does not allow us to investigate higher moments
or diﬀerent quantiles of the test score distributions, this would be an interesting question for future
work.
This research could be extended in a number of ways. First, as both more years of data and data
from more provinces are becoming available, increased sample sizes may allow for the estimation of
richer models. The approach can also be applied to data from outside of Canada, although extension
to US data will require addressing the selection issues with private schools. Finally, if peer eﬀects
are nonlinear, sorting may aﬀect average student performance as well as the variance in performance.
Future research may determine whether this is the case.
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Total # Schools 892 573
Total # Communities 205 205
Table 1: Frequency count of communities by number of schools, Grade 6 and Grade 9
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Table 2: Frequency count of communities by diﬀerence between number of Grade 6 and Grade 9 schools
in community
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Grade 9 Language Arts exam score
Community # writing 43.2 43.3 6.0 235
Community mean 68.5 4.9 40.6 79.5
Community variance 161.0 61.8 35.5 563.1
Cross-school variance 2.3 6.0 0.0 39.1
Grade 9 Math exam score
Community # writing 43.0 41.6 6.0 235
Community mean 29.8 4.3 10.9 39.3
Community variance 83.9 27.4 9.4 184.9
Cross-school variance 1.6 4.7 0.0 39.2
Table 3: Summary statistics for Language Arts and Math exam results
25Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Visible minority
Community mean 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.44
Community variance 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.25
Cross-school variance 0.0002 0.001 0.00 0.01
Aboriginal
Community mean 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.98
Community variance 0.04 0.059 0.00 0.25
Cross-school variance 0.0002 0.002 0.00 0.03
Oﬃcial language not usually spoken at home
Community mean 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.64
Community variance 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.24
Cross-school variance 0.0001 0.001 0.00 0.01
Annual Family Wage and salary income ($1,000)
Community mean 40.96 11.79 10.50 80.57
Community variance 198.20 192.35 11.75 1091.02
Cross-school variance 6.99 33.01 0.00 290.50
Annual Family Transfer Income ($1,000)
Community mean 4.39 1.49 1.76 11.96
Community variance 3.14 3.52 0.19 28.47
Cross-school variance 0.05 0.19 0.00 1.29
Education of primary parent (years)
Community mean 12.44 0.83 9.57 14.43
Community variance 0.96 1.02 0.04 8.63
Cross-school variance 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.82
Table 4: Summary statistics for family characteristics
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Avg # writing 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
(t-stat) 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.42 3.23 3.22 3.34 3.25 3.32
(p-value) 0.651 0.659 0.632 0.645 0.678 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
# schools 0.98 0.26 0.95 0.59 1.45 1.01 0.77 0.97 0.69 0.79
0.76 0.21 0.75 0.49 1.05 2.09 1.60 2.06 1.51 1.65
0.445 0.835 0.457 0.622 0.297 0.038 0.112 0.040 0.134 0.100
(# schools)2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
-0.79 -1.11 -0.77 -1.08 -1.93 -2.19 -2.60 -2.17 -2.77 -2.31
0.430 0.268 0.442 0.280 0.055 0.030 0.010 0.031 0.006 0.022
Var(Vis. Min.) 20.52 6.44 21.94 20.56 8.32 94.34 90.05 96.84 94.73 92.78
0.29 0.09 0.31 0.29 0.11 2.69 2.53 2.81 2.71 2.63
0.774 0.930 0.759 0.773 0.910 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.007 0.009
Var(Aboriginal) 49.98 47.20 40.90 43.74 43.67 -5.70 -6.53 -20.96 -10.33 -21.86
0.84 0.79 0.64 0.72 0.67 -0.20 -0.22 -0.71 -0.37 -0.72
0.403 0.429 0.524 0.472 0.505 0.845 0.823 0.479 0.714 0.470
Var(Home Lang.) -117.0 -111.06 -118.6 -119.99 -115.24 -144.9 -143.06 -147.84 -147.42 -145.81
-1.77 -1.66 -1.79 -1.81 -1.71 -3.66 -3.61 -3.74 -3.69 -3.67
0.079 0.099 0.076 0.072 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Var(W/S income) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
-0.33 -0.25 -0.37 -0.38 -0.28 -0.63 -0.56 -0.85 -0.72 -0.77
0.742 0.801 0.711 0.706 0.779 0.530 0.578 0.397 0.471 0.441
Var(Transfer inc.) -0.62 -0.62 -0.61 -0.65 -0.63 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 -0.20 -0.17
-0.73 -0.73 -0.72 -0.76 -0.72 -0.41 -0.41 -0.39 -0.45 -0.38
0.465 0.464 0.470 0.447 0.469 0.685 0.684 0.697 0.655 0.705
Var(Par. Educ.) 6.93 6.95 7.01 7.05 7.23 1.84 1.84 1.97 1.91 1.97
1.34 1.35 1.35 1.36 1.39 0.78 0.77 0.83 0.81 0.82
0.181 0.179 0.180 0.176 0.166 0.438 0.441 0.408 0.420 0.413
CSV(Vis. Min.) 13111.26 13692.88 4009.49 3869.15
2.62 2.57 2.73 2.42
0.010 0.011 0.007 0.016
CSV(Aboriginal) 827.26 226.51 1401.93 1483.34
1.02 0.21 3.91 3.11
0.308 0.836 0.000 0.002
CSV(Language) 15089.21 7008.70 11287.52 -1924.1
2.05 0.82 2.68 -0.49
0.042 0.415 0.008 0.626
Constant 154.15 154.46 154.41 154.76 154.74 78.27 78.38 78.70 78.78 78.74
14.55 14.58 14.51 14.56 14.49 20.04 20.08 20.10 20.17 20.04
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 5: Regression results: Community level variance of Grade 9 Test Scores, 2001 cross-sectional data,
with sorting by ethnicity and language
27Language Arts Mathematics
Avg # writing 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
(t-stat) 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.43 3.25 3.29 3.20 3.22
(p-value) 0.660 0.635 0.662 0.667 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
# schools 1.13 -0.12 1.64 1.05 0.69 0.16 1.39 0.70
0.83 -0.09 1.15 0.71 1.12 0.30 2.09 1.09
0.405 0.930 0.250 0.479 0.266 0.761 0.038 0.278
(# schools)2 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
-0.85 -0.02 -1.11 -0.59 -1.40 -0.59 -2.20 -1.11
0.399 0.983 0.267 0.557 0.163 0.555 0.029 0.269
Var(Visible Minority) 19.99 21.32 21.52 21.23 95.58 95.03 94.70 96.15
0.28 0.30 0.30 0.29 2.73 2.75 2.70 2.77
0.781 0.767 0.764 0.770 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.006
Var(Aboriginal) 51.43 44.13 50.92 48.63 -8.64 -10.05 -5.19 -10.32
0.84 0.72 0.85 0.79 -0.30 -0.36 -0.18 -0.36
0.401 0.470 0.395 0.432 0.763 0.721 0.859 0.716
Var(Home Language) -116.56 -119.73 -118.25 -120.96 -145.84 -147.06 -145.60 -148.80
-1.75 -1.80 -1.78 -1.81 -3.67 -3.71 -3.66 -3.71
0.081 0.074 0.076 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Var(W/S income) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
-0.28 -0.29 -0.33 -0.17 -0.74 -0.57 -0.63 -0.57
0.780 0.771 0.740 0.867 0.460 0.572 0.529 0.569
Var(Transfer income) -0.62 -0.85 -0.61 -0.95 -0.17 -0.36 -0.18 -0.36
-0.74 -0.95 -0.72 -1.03 -0.37 -0.75 -0.40 -0.74
0.461 0.342 0.470 0.303 0.712 0.452 0.690 0.459
Var(Parent’s Education) 6.89 7.08 7.03 7.14 1.92 1.96 1.89 2.08
1.32 1.36 1.36 1.35 0.80 0.83 0.79 0.86
0.187 0.177 0.177 0.178 0.422 0.410 0.431 0.391
CSV(W/S income) -0.02 -0.09 0.05 0.02
-0.23 -0.90 0.77 0.44
0.816 0.371 0.444 0.659
CSV(Transfer income) 22.86 30.83 17.35 18.37
2.01 2.53 3.00 3.78
0.046 0.012 0.003 0.000
CSV(Parent’s Education) -34.71 -52.97 -19.07 -35.51
-0.71 -1.27 -0.89 -1.98
0.480 0.207 0.375 0.049
Constant 154.56 156.34 154.11 154.90 78.81 79.46 77.87 78.96
14.39 14.50 14.45 14.24 19.82 20.15 19.53 19.57
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 6: Regression results: Community level variance of Grade 9 test scores, 2001 cross-sectional data,
with sorting by income and education
28Language Arts Mathematics Language Arts Mathematics
Avg # writing 0.05 0.14 Var(Parent’s Education) 7.15 1.98
(t-stat) 0.42 3.26 1.35 0.81
(p-value) 0.677 0.001 0.179 0.421
# schools 1.41 1.27 CSV(Visible minority) 13314.39 4487.62
0.87 1.98 2.79 2.24
0.384 0.049 0.006 0.026
(# schools)2 -0.02 -0.01 CSV(Aboriginal) 794.74 1823.67
-1.30 -1.93 0.41 2.51
0.194 0.055 0.684 0.013
Var(Visible Minority) 7.64 91.60 CSV(Language) -185.57 -5372.11
0.10 2.59 -0.02 -1.24
0.919 0.010 0.986 0.218
Var(Aboriginal) 42.65 -21.83 CSV(W/S income) -0.12 -0.07
0.64 -0.70 -0.76 -1.43
0.524 0.482 0.448 0.153
Var(Home Language) -115.00 -146.05 CSV(Transfer income) 18.55 9.18
-1.68 -3.65 1.23 1.08
0.094 0.000 0.220 0.282
Var(W/S income) 0.00 -0.01 CSV(Parent’s Education) -69.58 -21.03
-0.12 -0.51 -1.28 -0.95
0.902 0.611 0.201 0.343
Var(Transfer income) -0.84 -0.28 Constant 153.94 78.14
-0.88 -0.56 13.90 19.02
0.380 0.574 0.000 0.000
Table 7: Regression results: Community level variance of Grade 9 test scores, 2001 cross-sectional data,
with all sorting variables
29Language Arts Mathematics
∆# schools 0.07 -0.19 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 0.07 -0.04
(t-stat) 0.76 -0.63 0.76 -0.50 -0.54 1.54 1.56 -0.60
(p-value) 0.45 0.53 0.45 0.62 0.59 0.12 0.12 0.55
∆Avg # writing -0.17 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.17
-1.28 -0.97 -1.17 -1.15 3.11 2.58 3.01 2.73
0.20 0.33 0.24 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
∆CSV(Visible Minority) 15954.25 7092.47 6549.97
0.93 1.71 1.56
0.35 0.09 0.12
∆CSV(Aborig) 1250.38 -1407.81 -1511.93
0.74 -1.69 -1.75
0.46 0.09 0.08
∆CSV(Home Language) 12073.22 772.63 1394.29
3.87 0.57 1.33
0.00 0.57 0.19
Constant 15.09 15.27 15.07 16.01 -10.05 -10.15 -10.09 -9.93
2.58 2.61 2.57 2.71 -3.47 -3.52 -3.43 -3.40
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 8: Regression results: Diﬀerence in community level variance of Grade 9 test scores in 2001 and
Grade 6 test scores in 1998, with sorting by ethnicity and language
Language Arts Mathematics
∆# schools 0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.08
(t-stat) 0.02 0.57 0.46 -0.06 1.56 1.66 1.30 1.33
(p-value) 0.99 0.57 0.64 0.95 0.12 0.10 0.19 0.18
∆Avg # writing -0.13 -0.16 -0.16 -0.13 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.15
-0.88 -1.17 -1.19 -0.86 1.93 3.07 3.39 2.20
0.38 0.24 0.23 0.39 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.03
∆CSV(W/S Income) 0.19 0.15 -0.09 -0.16
1.15 0.79 -0.77 -1.52
0.25 0.43 0.44 0.13
∆CSV (Transfer Income) 6.62 0.56 2.87 3.89
0.61 0.05 0.69 1.77
0.54 0.96 0.49 0.08
∆CSV (Education) 23.72 21.95 28.60 30.06
6.10 5.22 7.84 9.54
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant 15.17 15.39 15.86 15.88 -10.17 -10.03 -9.32 -9.12
2.59 2.60 2.67 2.64 -3.52 -3.40 -3.21 -3.10
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 9: Regression results: Diﬀerence in community level variance of Grade 9 test scores in 2001 and
Grade 6 test scores in 1998, with sorting by income and education
30Language Arts Mathematics
∆# schools -0.23 0.00
(t-stat) -0.63 -0.02
(p-value) 0.53 0.98
∆Avg # writing -0.11 0.18
-0.77 2.48
0.44 0.01






∆CSV(Home Language) 22.06 -1548.93
4.56 -1.38
0.00 0.17
∆CSV(W/S Income) 9486.10 1438.96
0.48 1.30
0.63 0.20
∆CSV (Transfer Incomel) 53.83 -0.04
0.02 -0.50
0.99 0.62






Table 10: Regression results: Diﬀerence in community level variance of Grade 9 test scores in 2001 and
Grade 6 test scores in 1998, with all sorting variables
Language Arts Mathematics
CSV(Visible minority) 4.5% 2.5%
CSV(Aboriginal) .4% 1.7%
CSV(Home language) 3.3% 4.2%
CSV(Transfer Income) 2.5% 3.3%
Table 11: Predicted eﬀect on variance of test score from desegregating average multi-school community,
based on cross-sectional estimates.
31Language Arts Mathematics
Average Community
CSV(Home language) 2.6% .3%
CSV(Parent’s education) 1.2% 2.7%
Edmonton
CSV(Home language) 41.0% 4.8%
CSV(Parent’s education) 11.1% 39.1%
Table 12: Predicted eﬀect on variance of test score from desegregating multi-school communities, based
on ﬁxed eﬀects estimates.
32